Security culture and migration in the European Union[1]

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Abstract

The European Union is deeply divided by the migration flow of the Middle East as it does not have a complex security culture, that could help decision-makers perform the difference between the perception and representation of the threat. What Europeans perceive of the migrants and how they represent them and their impact on the European societies are entirely different concepts which plague public understanding as well as the measures taken by governments. On the one hand, this conundrum in perception versus representation has been used by pressure groups in order to exert influence upon governments and decision-makers. On the other, it is a case in point on how European societies still lack a proper security culture that can be used in order to devise appropriate policies and responses to threats.

Keywords: migration, European Union, security culture, security community, legislation , asylum.

Introduction

It is a fact that within states, maintaining a high degree of security, especially one that could provide the perception of safety among the people, often requires the resort to hard power instruments. Thus, security is usually associated with military power, weapons and strategies. However, soft power instruments are also necessary, especially given the fact that the feeling of security is mostly achieved on a mental level, and only then on a physical one.

Security can be interpreted from various points of view: as a tangible reality and as a mental state. From the two, the most important is the second one, given recent examples. People feel secure only in those situations in which they are comfortable with their surroundings, and this comfort is first and foremost a mental one. Walls and weapons are only marginally providers of security, as they serve the mental security in the first place. As a result, despite the heavy spending on military purposes, politicians and decision-makers are very much aware of the mental dimension of security, which they exploit to the very core to their advantage as long as it serves their purposes. It is what has been occurring with immigration policies lately, as many EU politicians have been modulating their discourses only to set fear among their citizens, aiming to transmit the fact that aside from the multicultural dimension, immigration has a large negative impact on social policies, on protection standards and on the overall description of the state as powerful and inflexible entity, intolerant to threats.

The very concept of security creates tension and has a conflictual potential, let alone by adding factors such as migrants and their negative impact on the domestic climate, social welfare, personal security, etc.

The ball and chain of "security culture". A theoretical analysis

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In order to be able to spread a positive feeling of security, states need to have an enhanced security culture. Authors such as Katzenstein refer to the term "culture as a broad label that denotes collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law. Culture refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another"[2]. Another useful definition was provided by Lungu, Buluc and Deac in a study published in 2018, entitled "Promoting the security culture: a report" (Promovarea culturii de Securitate: Raport), which deals with the more "cultural" and multidisciplinary dimension of this concept. Thus, according to them, "the security culture is the result of social interactions taking place among groups, organizations and communities preoccupied by aspects of social security, of learning and accumulating process, in agreement with the human needs of protection, safety and shelter"[3]. 7

The rapid development of the EU from an economic project to a political one prompted also the need for the creation of a security community as well, that could provide for all its members. However, in light of recent events can the EU be considered still a possible security provider? There are regional and national gaps that are hard to reconcile, at the same time as the lack of a strong incentive for better cooperation as is the case of the North Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, the EU is highly dependent on the United States for support and security. In the absence of American support, EU leaders are adamant at supporting a liberal order in which they themselves would become security providers for their countries and the neighbors. Consequently, lack of such support engenders lack of confidence from the other member states. Taking this into consideration, it appears that EU security culture as far as the threat of migrants is concerned is, in fact, a fair-weather regime[4] – there is a common border system – the Schengen Area, but the enforcement of this area is based on member states' goodwill and need of security. [5]Also, there is the common asylum policy which is still lacking effective measures and tools to be fully implemented. This reality is mainly caused by the desire of member states to retain much of their authority and sovereignty in matters of security and defence, destabilizing thus EU approaches towards the Common Defence and Security Policy.

The Schengen Area is an example of a Security Community[6]. Initially, it was considered "a common "imagined community" with a collective identity"[7]. It comprises the four freedoms and has deal with security by dividing it between member states, and making them all responsible for the security of their people and territory. The Schengen security community was born through protection mechanisms and coordination within the justice and home affairs space. Such mechanisms deal with highly pressing matters, such as counter-

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[2] Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 46.
[3] Ciprian Lungu, Ruxandra Buluc, Ioan Deac, *Promovarea culturii de securitate: Raport*, București, Top Form, 2018, p. 5.
[4] Bjorn Fagersten, August Danielson, *Order, integration and the development of European security and defense. Key uncertainties and future scenarios*, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, UI Paper, No.1, 2018, p. 10.
[5] Ibidem, p. 11.
[6] Tal Dingott Alkopher, Emmanuelle Blanc, Emmanuelle, "Schengen Area Shaken: the impact of immigration-related threat perceptions on the European security community", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 20 (3), 2016, p. 526.
[7] *Ibidem*, p. 526.

terrorism, police and judiciary cooperation, border and asylum cooperation as well as civil protection[8].

"European security and defense has been characterized by uncertainty, fragmentation and reluctance"[9]. This reality has been caused by the recent reluctance manifested by the US under president Trump to continue being Europe's security provider, as well as the rise of populism and nationalistic practices generated by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and the massive influx of migrants from MENA countries. This led to divisions among the member states, which failed to identify the most pressing danger, resulting in a lack of coordinated efforts to combat it, be it the immigration crisis, the rise of populist tendencies, etc.

The article written by Bjorn Fagersten and August Danielson suggest that since Brexit has played a great role in destabilizing the security culture of Europe, there are several solutions that need to be applied in order to be able to overcome such a crisis. The first is that of flexible integration, which would increase EU individual participation, resulting in a stronger EU military security, as this dimension shall no longer by at the goodwill of all member-states. Secondly, there is the need to strengthen the autonomy of Europe as a whole, and not simply of the EU, which is likely to determine a stronger UK-participation to EU-led missions and operations[10] - this would be a great asset in terms of strengthening the EU security culture altogether.

Another major stress concerning the European security culture is its lack of leadership. Until Brexit, European security was the responsibility of a specific triad – the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Until the settlement of a specific treaty between the EU and the UK with security and defense related purposes, the current French president is proposing a solution that could bring many benefits to the European security, consisting of " a way out of the integration paradox by linking future integrative gains to the needs of domestic audiences currently skeptical about cooperation and globalization"[11]. Thus, PESCO should not be perceived as a resort to increase individual military cooperation and capacity, but rather a way of increasing EU political unity in the aftermath of Brexit[12].

The tangible dimension of European security culture is affected by the fact that EU defense and security expenses have been scaled down lately, failing to take into consideration multiple threats as well as the need to have capabilities that could service the following areas: anti- access and area-denial, intelligence, surveillance, logistics, etc. As a result PESCO is attempting to create a form of military interoperability between member states, which should have been achieved earlier. In that regard, once this interoperability is achieved, it will have a great impact on CSDP crisis management missions, highlighting that such actions should be perceived as "expressions of what the EU and its member states are ready to do in response to a given conflict or crisis"[13]. This leads to the need of understanding PESCO as both providing

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[8] Niklas Bremberg, "The European Union as a Security Community-Building Institution> Venues, Networks and Co-operative Security Practices", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, No. 53 (3), 2015, pp. 674-692.
[9] Fagersten, *op.cit.*, p. 2.
[10] *Ibidem*, p. 3.
[11] *Ibidem*, p. 13.
[12] *Ibidem*, p. 19.
[13] *Ibidem*, p. 16.

autonomy for participation in operations, as well as strengthening the means of providing territorial security.

The European security culture took a strong blow to its reasoning after the Arab Spring. Prior to that, migration from MENA countries used to be kept at bay by strategically crafted deals. For instance, before the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, Italy enjoyed a rather controversial agreement with Libya, which kept migration from Northen Africa within reasonable limits[14].

The Arab Spring was the catalyst of extreme governance and humanitarian dilemmas, as a result of states' desperate efforts to control the huge wave of migrants stemming from that region. This led to an acute need to securitize policy and decision-making regarding migration within the directly affected countries. Furthermore, such attitudes are the generators of resilience towards this topic.

Before the Arab Spring, the EU resorted to only two instruments to tackle migration (which at the time was unfolded according to common expectations): the European Neighboring Policy and the Global Approach to Migration. After the mise en place of the Arab Spring, the EU made considerable efforts to revamp the Global Approach to Migration into the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). However, it proved impossible to use it solely for the management of the migrant flows from Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, and Iraq, and naturally it took its toll on the European security culture.

After the Arab Spring, all countries involved made desperate moves attempting to halt migration – these measures were a blatant acknowledgement of the fact that these countries were very much incapable to deal with a large group of migrants – certainly more than they have taken into account previously.

Legislative aspects of migration in the European Union

There is a large amount of legislation available to apply when dealing with the situation of migrants within the EU. The debut of this legislative framework was a rather feeble one, with the Tampere Programme[15] in 1999, establishing a common European system, followed by the Hague Programme[16] in 2010, the European Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2008 and the Stockholm Programme in 2009, for the 2010-2014 period.

The following table shall present an overview on the mail legal instruments to be employed when dealing with migrant-related issues:

No.	Document	Content
1	Council Decision 2015/1601/ 22 September 2015	-provisional measures in international protection for Italy and Greece (needless to say, as they are entry points for the migrants from Northern Africa, they were the most affected)

[14] Matthew N. Metzel, John M. Lorenzen, "Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe", in *Parameters*, 47 (3), Autumn 2017, p. 54.

[15] ***, *Presidency conclusions. Tampere European Council*, 15-16 October 1999, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, accessed 12.05.2018.

[16] *** "The Hague Programme, Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union", in The *Official Journal of the European Union*, 3rd March 2005, available at https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/The-Hague-Programme.pdf, accessed 12.05.2018.

2	Regulation No. 603/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council - 26th June 2013	-	The establishment of Eurodac "for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation No. 604/2013, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation No. 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice"[17]
3	Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26TH June 2013	-	Standards for the reception of applicants for international protection
4	Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of the 26th June 2013	-	Common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection
5	Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011	-	"standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted"[18].
6	Regulation No. 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010	-	The establishment of a European Asylum Support Office
7	Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001	-	On minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof

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[17] ***, *Migration and Asylum: A Challenge for Europe*, European Parliament, April 2018, p. 5, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/600414/IPOL_PERI(2017)600414_EN.pdf, accessed 10.05.2018.
[18] *Ibidem*, p. 5

The European Parliament is a co-legislator, together with the Council of the EU in asylum-related issues. Additionally, the European Parliament can bring an action for annulment before the Court of Justice on such matters.

The management of immigration policy within the European Union should be founded on solidarity, one of the main principles regulating the EU. However, according to article 78(3) in the event of a sudden flow of migrants from outside the EU, the Council shall consult beforehand with the Parliament, but shall legislate afterwards on its own.

Impact of the migration crisis over the European security culture

As far as crisis management is concerned, the EU has been active in providing a conceptual framework of dealing with the matter, rather than effective tools. Indeed, a conceptual framework is highly useful, as it establishes the powers and limits of EU action, as well as its fields of interest.

Noteworthy in this regard are the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility and the European Agenda on Migration.The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, adopted by the Commission in 2011 is dealing with the following aspects: regular and irregular immigration, mobility, human being trafficking, international protection, impact of migration on development

The European Agenda on Migration, issued by the Commission in 2015 approaching four key areas that need to be taken into consideration for policy-issuing: reducing incentives for irregular immigration, border management, developing a stronger common asylum policy and establishing a new policy on regular immigration. The contents of the Agenda draw attention to the need to better regulate both regular and irregular immigration, establishing a clear approach and management of the two, in order to eliminate confusion and be able to deal with smuggling networks and combat human trafficking. These four guidelines aim also at the increase of the CSDP role in the Mediterranean to reduce human smuggling.

It is a fact that at present, the EU is more effective at regulating rather than integrating.A thorough management of the immigration crisis should also focus on border management, where the EU has several elements put into practice, but with little efficiency lately. It is a fact that the EU external border control needs better operationalized tools as well as a better cooperation between states, in implementing the existing mechanisms: the Schengen Area, the Schengen Information System, the Visa Information System and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). All these integrate aspects such as border control, documentation of all third-country persons crossing the EU external borders, police and judicial cooperation, information exchange and alerts on visas, consular dialogue and cooperation on the issuing of visas, and effective border management.

In the aftermath of the many repeated immigration crises, the EU attempted to develop rapid reaction teams that could be deployed fast when dealing with a huge influx of migrants. Good examples in this regard are the Joint Operation Triton - in charge with patrolling the sea border between the Libya and Italy and Joint Operation Poseidon in Greece. In addition, there are also "hotspots" established at the very entry-points[19].

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[19] *Ibidem*, p. 15.

The degree of stress provoked to the EU security culture is visible through the many existing and upcoming instruments, established with the purpose of scaling down the numbers of illegal immigrants attempting to enter EU territory daily.

The perception of immigration-related threats is responsible for generating security dilemmas, which later escalate in unilateral practices, which reduce trust among states and diminish any integratory perspectives that might have been previously embraced. This is especially true of the EU, where there is a common policy on migration in place, but states are becoming more and more adamant to show an integratory view, especially after 9/11 and the massive flow of migrants that have been pouring from the Middle East in recent years.

The pressure born from the migration flows led also to the debate on the viability of the Schengen Area, which is no longer a wonderful project, but rather an obstacle in effectively shutting down borders to any kind of migrants.

Within the EU, member states have reacted differently to the issue of migration flows. This differentiated reaction was due to several factors: the geographic position (states such as Italy and Greece, on the external border of the EU had a first-hand interaction with migrant flows, while others, such as France and Germany have had the advantage of later impact).

Building a EU security culture in the face of migration

A security community is "a group of people who have become integrated to the point where there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way"[20].

Depending on the factors which plague a security community, there are several steps to be followed when investing its response to a threat, and in this case, the EU response to immigration: adopting policies of cooperative and collective security, establishing high levels of military integration, policy coordination against threats, free movement of individuals between different member states, which are not a potential threat and coordinated public policies and systems of rule to the point of internalizing policies and law"[21].

Authors such as Tal Dingott Alkopher and Emmanuelle Blanc consider that the exploitation of the fear of migrants leads to disbalances within the security communities themselves: "a perceived migrant-related threat affects fundamental areas of life and basic interests, causing significant fears, a loss of benchmarks, and deep uncertainties, thus destabilizing the basic trust on which the SC (security community) is built, in the new atmosphere of fear and uncertainty"[22]. Thus, the security community will turn to self-defense practice, which are likely to turn into a spiral effect against the migrants. When such a behavior is replicated on a state level, then the spiral effect gets bigger and trust among states is broken, as they are no longer confident in each other's capability to deal with such threats and counter them at bay. This leads to other states becoming apprehensive of migrants, and resorting to their own measures against them.

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[20] Alkopher, *op.cit.,* p. 518.
[21] *Ibidem*, pp. 518-519.
[22] *Ibidem*, p. 522.

The causes of such mistrust and spiraling effect are numerous and while some of them and not easily dealt with, others fall in the states' responsibility.There are two sides to the perception of immigration-related threats: on the one hand, it can strengthen the security community, determining its decision-makers and stakeholders to take the appropriate measures that would make its a stronghold in the face of threat. On the other hand, it can destabilize such a community, highlighting its core faults and its lack of power to coalesce all necessary forces and unite in the face of danger. Furthermore, as was the case with the European Union, such a threat can fuel traditionalist and populist rhetorics, building thus a type of solidarity that can unite people against an appeasing perspective towards immigration, rather than in favor of a more ammenable perspective.

It is usually the national elites which contribute to the construction of immigration as a threat, especially focusing on its destabilizing effect on social policies. This is often done as a means of shifting political capital from one party to another depending on the conditions. Furthermore, "securitization of migration involves extreme politicization and framing of migration as a security threat"[23]. This is usually the practice, in order to be able to justify and legitimize a series of practices that could lead up to contested policies against migration.Once being perceived as a threat, immigration contributes to the enhancement of the security dilemma within a community.

The anti-immigration rhetoric dates back to the 1990s and was accentuated by the 9/11 events. Such a rhetoric is visible in most European countries, such as Switzerland. Greece, Italy, Malta, Germany, Austria, France, as well as in many Central European countries. The latter have struggled to a large extent to become EU members, and some of them are still attempting to develop their own coping mechanisms, let alone add groups of migrants to be managed.

The challenge of migration opposed to the wonderful project of the Schengen area has led many decision-makers to believe that the principle of collective security that has been regulating the affairs of most European states is not effective enough. Thus, migration has shown that although being a great project, the Schengen Are is not sufficiently secure and does not have the necessary means to create security for itself and its citizens. The result question would be then, what mechanism should be put in place to create such a security?

Upon the massive arrival of migrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, accusations on the bad management of these groups have been flown from one country to another. The easiest solution embraced by states was that of sealing the borders, or reinstating military control. This was common in Hungary, Slovenia, Austria, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. It was the solution at hand to deal with the high numbers of migrants attempting to enter their territories. Such a solution indicates the lack of trust in the capacity of neighboring countries to deal effectively with the problem and provide solutions that could benefit all other affected states. These solutions are doubled by a lack of trust in the role and power of the European Union institutions in managing the situation and the boldness of some of its nations, as was the case of France in 2012, when former president

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[23] *Ibidem*, p. 519.

Sarkozy threatened to withdraw the country from Schengen, unless EU regulations on migration were toughened[24].

It is a fact that the type of policies used by the European Union en ensemble, as well as by each of its member states have affected the security community and its portrayal worldwide. States are perceived as suspicious of each other, incapable of concerted efforts, preferring to go back to traditional coping mechanisms, such as border control, fingerprinting, military patrolling, etc., rather than dealing with the root causes of migration.

There are several elements which need to be taken into consideration when analysing threats to security communities:

- Multilateralism – states have the possibility of choosing their own approach towards migrants and threats in general, which leads to a multitude of ideas and the resort to different methods of dealing with this aspect.
- Insufficiently fortified borders – states need to enforce better border protection measures
- Perceptions of security and threat – states and decision-makers do not have a unitary view of security and threats and are free to resort to such perceptions whenever necessary
- Discourse – this is inter-connected with the previous aspect – perception of security and threat, as decision-makers and stakeholders resort to different types of discourse on migration and its impact on national security, whenever there is such a need, or they are in need of a justification of one approach to the matter or another.
- Weaker internal policies – there is an acute differentiation between states' policies on migration. Usually, those countries with weaker policies in this regard are the ones fearing most the phenomenon and are likely to pass the responsibility to other states which they consider to be stronger. This has been the case of Serbia and Croatia, for instance, which have opened their borders for entry and exit to migrants, hoping that they would head north to better developed countries. And that is what actually happened.
- Free movement of population, as established by the 4 freedoms of the European Union. Once a statutory law, it is highly difficult to restrain such a freedom, based on perceptions and representations of fear of migrants.

A tackling of the migration crisis needs to have a comprehensive approach on a cause-effect basis. It is a certain fact that the unstable context of the Middle East and Northern Africa will continue to generate a massive influx of migrants towards Europe, and European governments and decision-makers are likely to find themselves insufficiently prepared to deal with such high numbers. Consequently, the affected governments are prone to look forward to more than civilian response measures. Additionally, since 2015, terrorist activities in Europe have spiked and not few voices uttered a connection between the migrant presence on European soil and the perpetrators. Confronted with a diminished confidence of the people in the central authorities, as well as a decreasing feeling of national safety, governments are bound to make

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[24] Henry Samuel, "France election 2012: Nicholas Sarkozy threatens to pull France out of Schengen Zone", *The Telegraph*, 11th March 2012, available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/nicolas-sarkozy/9137093/France-election-2012-Nicolas-Sarkozy-threatens-to-pull-France-out-of-Schengen-zone.html, accessed 10.05.2018.

the appropriate moves. All these have an impact on the security culture as we know it and experience it. Furthermore, this security culture can also be affected by medical concerns, related to the migrants, "as displaced populations historically carry a disproportionate percentage of infectious diseases, such as human immunodeficiency virus and hepatitis"[25].

Another viable solution would be to focus more on de-securitization strategies – they usually emanate from the public and NGO level, but they could also be constructed by security communities; they are, in fact, the most appropriate actors to deal with such elements, as they could draw on the cause-effect relationship and turn a threat into a solution.

Furthermore, the management of the migration policy within the European Union and its impact on the security culture would be insufficient in the absence of an analysis of the EU asylum policy. The asylum policy is in fact what given the approach of migration a handful.

The Lisbon Treaty is essential in the analysis of the asylum policy, as it is the one responsible for its transformation in a common policy, comprising the following elements: the status of asylum, the status of subsidiary protection, the means regulating temporary protection, procedures for the granting of the asylum status, reception conditions, partnership and cooperation with other countries, with a special focus on relocation policies.

The elements of the asylum policy are: the establishment of common asylum arrangements, as well as "offering the appropriate status to third-country nationals requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement"[26].

In the absence of convergence on threat perception, the result is no unitary response. Again, the migrant crisis is a casein-point, as while some countries opened their arms to welcome the wave of migrants from the MENA countries, others used all resources to state their displeasure at having to deal with such a matter. The climax was reached when the receiving quotas were imposed, with some member countries blatantly blurting out their incapacity to deal with the matter, as well as their desire simply not to.

The best solution for the EU to deal with such crises is to focus and develop its "strategic autonomy", a concept referred to in the European Union Global Strategy. Emphasizing this type of autonomy, the EU would be able to engage in partnerships with the required entities to deal with the crisis at-hand, without having to give much of its sovereignty altogether.

"In 2016, President Donald Trump addressed the topic of Europe's mass migration crisis – If you do not treat the situation competently and firmly, yes, it is the end of Europe. (…) Compounding this challenge , members of criminal and terrorist organizations have embedded themselves in and recruited from, vulnerable migrant and refugee populations"[27]. The migrant crisis might not be the Doomsday of Europe, but it is most certainly a stringent matter that needs to be addressed rapidly and effectively due to the multiple implications it carries.

The type of solution chosen for the management of refugees differ in intensity and perspective. While accommodating refugees and providing for their well-being has been

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[25] Metzel, *op.cit.*, p. 53.
[26] ***, Migration and Asylum, *op.cit.*
[27] Metzel, *op.cit.*, p.51.

considered too soft a measure, deterrence actions, such as sealing down the borders and migratory routes has been considered too rough, as it transforms migration in a national threat.

A proper solution would mean renegotiating accommodation plans with other countries that can shoulder the burden of the Syrian refugee crisis, such as Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, especially Turkey, which has shown in the past years a tremendous composure of keeping refugees in camps, instead of letting them flee to other areas within the country or outside it. In this regard, Turkey should be perceived as an incredible asset in managing the flow of refugees, as well as an example of good practices. In fact, Turkey is applying a policy of resilience, and this is the key to dealing with mass displacements of people within the EU[28] and to enhancing the security culture on the European continent.

Another important aspect is the dilemmas triggered by the migration crisis in terms of timing. Apart from the difficulty of dealing with such a massive group of people, the crisis itself is becoming more difficult to apprehend due to the fact that it renews a series of debates on countries refusing to transfer too many elements of sovereignty[29], highlighting the immense costs that that such a transfer might produce. The refugee crisis is a case in point.

The security dilemma stems in fact from the discourse operationalizing the concept of "migration crisis". Since decision-makers and elites choose to define this situation as a crisis and a threat to national security and integrity, states and people are bound to feel insecure. A feeling of insecurity leads to strict measures which , while intended to create more security, in fact, have the opposite effect, leading to uncertainty and an increased need of other measures that could build up the very much intended security. Depending on the domestic situation, "migration is an attempt to regain control over one's political destiny"[30].

It is a fact that the European-type of response to the crisis – "outsourcing border protection, donating aid to build the resilience of third countries, devising refugee distribution quotas"[31] is insufficient, and the EU needs to look for other outside partners in order to share the responsibility/burden of managing the migration crisis.

Conclusions

Crisis management in the EU is affected mainly by differing perceptions of the threats and the lack of appropriate solidarity, one of the Union's very functioning principles. As the long-term effects of Brexit unfold, member states tend to play more assertive roles, as is the case of France, which draws on its position as UNSC permanent member and a nuclear power, to take the lead[32].

Given the fact that member-states fail to share experience and expertise, especially with regard to military intervention, it can be easily stated that there is no registered convergence on security culture on the EU level. The migrant crisis has been a very good case -in -point.

Metzel and Lorenzen argue that based on the model provided by the management of refugees during the Second World War and the Kosovo Crisis, the EU could and should devise

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[28] Fakhoury, *op.cit.*, p. 8.
[29] *Ibidem*, p. 10.
[30] *Ibidem*, p. 13.
[31] *Ibidem*, p. 14
[32] *Ibidem*, p. 23.

plans to establish a firm migrant/refugee policy[33]. In both cases, the local population viewed the migrants/displaced people/refugees as a threat, but the national states resorted to inter-governmental help and support, as thus succeeded in bridging the humanitarian crisis. A pivotal role was that of the United States of America in establishing extremely well-organized humanitarian operations in both situations and this is the suggestion of the authors for the EU migrants crisis as well. The US provided a military model of management, synchronizing field logistical requirements with the ample situation of a mass migration event.

The resort to US support and help in sorting this humanitarian crisis is not unnatural, as there is already an institutional cooperation between the EU and the United States in NATO. Thus, an inter-allied cooperation would be highly beneficial in terms of solving the migration crisis, both economically and socially, as well as in terms of providing a much-needed stability within the EU, and demonstrating its capability to deal with ongoing crises. However, in such an endeavor, all member countries need to contribute actively, providing any kind of support and coordination at hand, in order to reduce the risk of the phenomenon spilling over their borders in the near/distant future. States need to have a "strong and resilient security posture in NATO"[34], and EU members are no exception to that.

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